From this analysis we also see that media coverage was higher when the perpetrator was arrested partly because an arrest is a reportable event in itself ; the target of the attack was law enforcement or government; and when people were killed in the attack. Which events do and do not receive media coverage matter: evidence shows that media plays a defining role in shifting public opinion; perceptions of the importance of particular issues; and national policy conversations.
In particular, increased coverage when a perpetrator is Muslim presents an unbalanced overview of US terrorism to the public.
In the dataset that this study relied on, Muslims perpetrated Combined with the fact that terrorism in general gets a disproportionate amount of media attention, the fact that the worst attacks — those that cause the greatest number of deaths — get most attention further exacerbates public fear. One of the primary motivations for our work at Our World in Data is to provide a fact-based overview of the world we live in — a perspective that includes the persistent and long-term changes that run as a backdrop to our daily lives.
We aim to provide the complement to the fast-paced reporting we see in the news. The media provides a near-instantaneous snapshot of single events; events that are, in most cases, negative.
The persistent, large-scale trends of progress never make the headlines. But is there evidence that such a disconnect exists between what we see in the news and what is reality for most of us? One study attempted to look at this from the perspective of what we die from: is what we actually die from reflected in the media coverage these topics receive?
For each source the authors calculated the relative share of deaths, share of Google searches, and share of media coverage. They restricted the considered causes to the top 10 causes of death in the US and additionally included terrorism, homicide, and drug overdoses. This allows for us to compare the relative representation across different sources. The coverage in both newspapers here is strikingly similar.
And the discrepancy between what we actually die from and what we get informed of in the media is what stands out:. One way to think about it is that media outlets may produce content that they think readers are most interested in, but this is not necessarily reflected in our preferences when we look for information ourselves.
As we can see clearly from the chart above, there is a disconnect between what we die from, and how much coverage these causes get in the media. Another way to summarize this discrepancy is to calculate how over- or underrepresented each cause is in the media. To do this, we simply calculate the ratio between the share of deaths and share of media coverage for each cause.
In this chart, we see how over- or underrepresented each cause is in newspaper coverage. Numbers denote the factor by which they are misrepresented. Homicides are also very overrepresented in the news, by a factor of The most underrepresented in the media are kidney disease fold , heart disease fold , and, perhaps surprisingly, drug overdoses 7-fold.
Stroke and diabetes are the two causes most accurately represented. But there is another important question: should these be representative? The first is that we would expect there to be some preventative aspect to information we access.
There are several examples where I can imagine this to be true. People who are concerned about cancer may search online for guidance on symptoms and be convinced to see their doctor. Some people with suicidal thoughts may seek help and support online which later results in an averted death from suicide.
Some imbalance in the relative proportions therefore makes sense. But clearly there is some bias in our concerns: most people die from heart disease hence it should be something that concerns us yet only a small minority seek [possibly preventative] information online.
Second, this study focused on what people in the USA die from, not what people across the world die from. Is media coverage more representative of global deaths? Not really. The relative ranking of deaths in the USA is reflective of the global average: most people die from heart disease and cancers, and terrorism ranks last or second last alongside natural disasters. Terrorism accounted for 0. The third relates to the very nature of news: it focuses on events and stories. Whilst I am often critical of the messages and narratives portrayed in the media, I have some sympathy for what they choose to cover.
Reporting has become increasingly fast-paced. Combine this with our attraction to stories and narratives. The most underrepresented cause of death in the media was kidney disease. But with an audience that expects a minute-by-minute feed of coverage, how much can possibly be said about kidney disease? Without conquering our compulsion for the latest unusual story, we cannot expect this representation to be perfectly balanced. Media and its consumers are stuck in a reinforcing cycle.
The news reports on breaking events, which are often based around a compelling story. We come to expect news updates with increasing frequency, and media channels have clear incentives to deliver.
This locks us into a cycle of expectation and coverage with a strong bias for outlier events. Most of us are left with a skewed perception of the world; we think the world is much worse than it is. The responsibility in breaking this cycle lies with both media producers and consumers. Will we ever stop reporting and reading the latest news? But we can all be more conscious of how we let this news shape our understanding of the world.
And journalists can do much better in providing context of the broader trends: if reporting on a homicide, for example, include context of how homicide rates are changing over time. This requires us to check our often unconscious bias for single narratives and seek out sources that provide a fact-based perspective on the world.
This antidote to the news is what we try to provide at Our World in Data. It should be accessible for everyone, which is why our work is completely open-access. Whether you are a media producer or consumer, feel free to take and use anything you find here. Shares of deaths, media coverage and Google searches over time The interactive charts present the full annual data series published by Shen et al.
Due to data availability Google Trends data only runs from the year to In our research on terrorism we rely on the Global Terrorism Database GTD as a key source of data on incidents and fatalities from terrorism across the world.
It does, however, have limitations which we think should be clear before making inferences from trends or signals represented by the data.
In the area of terrorism research, there are now multiple databases available which attempt to record and detail terrorist incidents across the world. We take a more detailed look at the differences in estimates from these three databases here. In it was officially published as an academic output in the journal Terrorism and Political Violence , and since then has been one of the widely used resources within academic research on terrorism.
The GTD is therefore well-respected and highly-regarded as a comprehensive data source on global terrorism. The GTD — as with other terrorism databases — are curated through records and analysis of print and electronic media. We expect that the collation of incidents across the world today and in the recent past is sufficiently complete to understand the global distribution of terrorist incidents and how they have changed over time. A valuable resource which also provides impressive accounts of terrorist incidents across the world is the many detailed entries in Wikipedia by year, by region or by country.
Using this as a cross-reference with the GTD, we have high confidence in the completeness of global data in recent years. Where we have less confidence is the completeness of the data for inferring longer-term changes.
The GTD extends back to In their accounts of the GTD, the authors of the database acknowledge that data for this earlier period most likely undercounts the number of terrorist incidents and victims.
The shift to digital media in recent years has made this process much easier. Global records of terrorist incidents — at least in the first half of the dataset — are therefore likely to be an underestimate. We have found no research which attempts to quantify the extent of this underestimate, so we cannot say by how much.
We do think some countries or regions — most notably the US and Western Europe — have a high degree of completeness over these decades. Until the GTD was collated by Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service PGIS which trained US researchers to identify terrorist incidents from reports, governmental records and international media to assess the risk of terrorism for clients. We would expect that this mandate would mean records are skewed towards more complete coverage of incidents in the US and countries with better reporting and records of incidents, such as Western Europe.
But for major incidents, there are closely matched. For other regions we would caution against inferring trends over this complete time period.
One key reason we have reservations about the completeness of earlier data is that there are several incidents we would have expected to have featured in the GTD which are not included. The other limitation to inferring particular trends in terrorism are changes in methodology and shifting — or unclear — definitions of terrorism over time.
Even within the research community there are differences in its scope, and there are often blurry lines between what constitutes terrorism as opposed to other forms of violence such as homicide and civil war.
We discuss the definition of terrorism used by the GTD here and how its methodology differs from other well-known databases here. But an additional question when trying to understand changes, is whether the GTD had a consistent definition and methodology over time. As previously mentioned, the GTD has been maintained by four organizations since With time — and particularly with the shift towards maintenance by an academic organization — the criteria for a terrorist incident improved and refined over time.
Whilst researchers have attempted to retrospectively revise estimates particularly of the period from to based on updated criteria, the authors caution that there will inevitably be issues in data consistency over this period. This inconsistency will, most likely, be expressed in an underestimate of terrorist incidents earlier in the dataset. For this reason, again, we would be cautious about trying to infer changes in the prevalence of terrorism globally and across most regions since In terrorism research, there are multiple databases available which attempt to record and detail terrorist incidents across the world.
Nonetheless, estimates of the number of terrorist incidents and fatalities vary across these databases. Understanding why these differences exist is important for how this data is interpreted, and what we can conclude about the prevalence, causes and consequences of terrorism. Our understanding of the sources and frequency of terrorism can have a significant impact on many areas of society and policy, including immigration, counterterrorism efforts, and international relations.
Why is this the case? In a study published in the Journal of Peace Research , Sandler looked at the differences in methodology, estimates, and conclusions from the various terrorism databases in detail. Domestic terrorist incidents are those where the venue, perpetrators and victims are all from the same country: for example, a terrorist attack committed in the United States by a US citizen against victims from the US.
If an attack involves more than one country — if the venue or victims of the attack are not the same country as the perpetrators — then it is classified as transnational.
During this time it included domestic incidents, whilst RAND did not. Since — when RAND also included domestic attacks — their figures have converged. A very clear example of this is seen if we look at figures in the United Kingdom.
Understanding the reasons for variations in the estimates of terrorist deaths may have a substantial impact on research and resource allocation. The root causes of transnational and domestic terrorism can be very different. The economic impacts — whether in the form of counterterrorism strategies; defence measures; or tourism impacts — can also vary significantly. Beyond differences in the inclusion of domestic and transnational events, some differences in estimates exist. Most databases used in terrorism research are curated and maintained from media reports, whether print or digital media.
Differences in the completeness and choices of media sources can lead to further variation between databases. This is because media sources do not always report, or accurately report terrorist events; this can lead to absent or conflicting estimates.
Therefore, even when databases use the same definition of terrorism, the reported number of deaths depend on which media sources the database uses. The data visualisations in this page are generated using the Global Terrorism Database GTD , and so it is important to understand the definition used in their construction.
The GTD database uses the following definition of a terrorist attack:. The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.
In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:. In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:. We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.
All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim s or object of the terrorist attack. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.
One important point of departure in many legal definitions of terrorism is computer hacking. The UK the Terrorism Act defines terrorism as:. The use or threat of action designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public, or a section of the public; made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause; and it involves or causes:.
Summary Over the past decade, terrorists killed an average of 21, people worldwide each year. Countries with truly effective counter-terrorism strategies recognize the value of involving local communities, the private sector, the media, and other groups in society. They also encourage the exchange of intelligence, information, and expertise between national agencies and across borders. The broader the response, the more effective it is likely to be.
The road ahead Over the past ten years, we have seen states try a variety of approaches to reduce the chance of terrorists succeeding.
The United Nations has provided guidance and support in their endeavors, focusing on areas where we have a comparative advantage. As a leader in the global fight against terrorism, our Organization will continue to press Governments to adopt comprehensive national strategies that balance hard-end security measures with social, economic, and community-driven policies that are grounded in the rule of law.
The truth is that measures that try to take shortcuts or are not respectful of international human rights norms can actually undermine the collective effort by bolstering resentment in parts of the community and providing grist for terrorist groups' propaganda mills.
In the coming years, we will do more to help countries improve their internal coordination and their cooperation with neighbours. But breaking down institutional barriers and building trust between competing agencies as well as across borders takes time. The regional and global events we organize aim to facilitate those processes, giving professionals an opportunity to meet face to face and brainstorm on good practices. Once back home, they can implement the lessons learned and call on their international network for support.
We work with bilateral and multilateral agencies that can share their expertise with countries in need of technical assistance. Services available include drafting national laws, training prosecutors and judges, and linking national databases to border posts. The United Nations can also offer support with, for example, education programmes aimed at building tolerance in communities and development projects directed at improving governance.
Our bird's eye view has allowed us to follow counter-terrorism developments across the globe, learning along the way what works and what does not. And when I consider what we have already achieved, I am optimistic about what we can accomplish together as nations and people of the world over the next decade. Working as one, we can significantly reduce the number of attacks and victims and, hopefully, one day eliminate the terrorist threat completely.
The development of conflict-sensitive approaches highlights how sustainable development can be made more effective through a consideration of peace and security. Despite numerous challenges and obstacles, which are far greater now than prior to the events of August , there are still many ways for the international community to help education move forward in Afghanistan.
As we find ourselves in the greatest education crisis of our generation, literacy interventions can act as an antidote to the long-term effects of COVID Skip to main content.
Toggle navigation Welcome to the United Nations. One of the three necessary criteria for inclusion is that there must be sub-national perpetrators. The database does not exclude cases in which states sponsor attacks by non-state actors that otherwise meet the inclusion criteria.
On a very limited basis, the GTD may reference other databases or chronologies among the sources of information for individual cases. Supplemental data collection efforts are subject to the same GTD definitional criteria and inclusion practices as the primary data collection process.
In practice, trained researchers decide whether a case they are working on fulfills these criteria, and this decision is reviewed by GTD supervisory staff. In cases where determination is difficult, the case is raised for review and deliberation among the full data collection team. While efforts have been made to assure the continuity of the data from to the present, users should keep in mind that the data collection was done as events occurred up to , retrospectively between and , and again concurrently with the events after This distinction is important because some media sources have since become unavailable, hampering efforts to collect a complete census of terrorist attacks between and Moreover, since moving the ongoing collection of the GTD to the University of Maryland in the Spring of , START staff have made significant improvements to the methodology that is used to compile the database.
Thus, users should note that differences in levels of attacks before and after January 1, , before and after April 1, , and before and after January 1, may be at least partially explained by differences in data collection; and researchers should adjust for these differences when modeling the data.
In general, trends over time should be interpreted with caution due to the possible effects of changing availability of reliable source materials. Likewise, the GTD is not directly comparable to other sources of data on terrorism, as differences in definitions, sources, and workflows will produce misleading inferences. Statistical information contained in the Global Terrorism Database is based on reports from a variety of open media sources.
Information is not added to the GTD unless and until we have determined the sources are credible. Users should not infer any additional actions or results beyond what is presented in a GTD entry and specifically, users should not infer an individual associated with a particular incident was tried and convicted of terrorism or any other criminal offense. If new documentation about an event becomes available, an entry may be modified, as necessary and appropriate.
All decisions about GTD data collection are made independently by the research team. The GTD does not represent the official position of any funding agency. Our distribution partner, CHC Global will confirm access. Non-government organizations interested in using the GTD should select "Organizational Use," and fill out the brief form to request access.
CHC Global will respond with additional information about licensing and fees. USG users can select "Organizational Use" and fill out the brief form to request access. Our distribution partner, CHC Global will respond with additional information about licensing and fees. Department of Homeland Security. What is the GTD? Learn more. Defining Terrorism. GTD Codebook.
Why has the licence for using GTD changed? Can I still search and browse the data without downloading the file? Why is there a delay in releasing the data?
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